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Entrepreneur—a Jockey or a Horse Owner? 
 
Introduction 
The business literature has long been concerned with understanding why people become entrepreneurs 
and what makes their ventures successful (e.g., Blanchflower and Oswald 1998; Hamilton 2000; Nanda 
and Sorensen 2010). The literature that studies an individual’s decision to become an entrepreneur has, 
however, mixed together two important issues—founding a new business and being the right person to 
operate the firm. Up until recently, entrepreneurship scholars have typically assumed that founders run 
their ventures personally (e.g., Berglann et al. 2011; Hamilton 2000; Nanda and Sorensen 2010). In line 
with this expectation, the empirical entrepreneurship research has been largely limited to self-employed 
individuals and owner-managers of incorporated firms while omitting individuals who founded firms but 
did not manage them (Van Praag and Versloot 2007). Yet it is not clear from either a theoretical or an 
empirical standpoint why founders should always run their firms themselves (Beckman and Burton 2008). 
The literature reports plenty of cases where entrepreneurs have great business ideas but lack operational 
knowledge and suggests, for example, that entrepreneurs with engineering backgrounds may benefit from 
hiring managers with business skills (Clarysse and Moray 2004; Muller and Murmann 2016; Wasserman 
2003).  
Recent empirical evidence also demonstrates that a significant share of entrepreneurs delegate 
firm operation to a hired CEO soon after founding. Beckman and Burton (2008) study the evolution of 
top-management teams in Silicon Valley high-technology start-ups and note that founders do not always 
hold top-management positions in their firms. Kaplan et al. (2009) examine a sample of 50 US firms and 
find that 34 percent of them had hired CEOs at the time of the business plan. Kulchina (2016) and 
Kulchina and Oxley (2017) show that in Russia close to 40 percent of nascent small businesses have hired 
CEOs. Similarly, we observe that 10 percent of start-ups in Denmark have hired managers at the time of 
founding. 
The choice of the top manager is a critical decision for entrepreneurs since early managers have 
profound and long-lasting impact on start-up performance (Beckman and Burton 2008; Graffin et al. 
2013). Whether the founder is an optimal manager for his or her firm strongly depends on the founder’s 
motives for retaining managerial control, i.e., whether the founder’s decision to operate the firm 
personally is driven by expected non-pecuniary benefits of management or by more strategic 
considerations. In our paper, we examine what motivates entrepreneurs to actively engage in operating 
their firms as opposed to confining themselves to the founding role and hiring a manager. 
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Agency theory predicts that, all else equal, owners should be the best managers for their firms 
because their incentives are well aligned with firm performance (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Recent 
work, however, criticizes this view by saying that in closely held firms, owners may have nonpecuniary 
motives for retaining control that are not necessarily aligned with profit maximization (Gomez-Mejia et 
al. 2007; Wasserman 2017). Indeed, a founder may not always be the best person to manage his or her 
business (Wasserman 2017). Prior literature demonstrates that investors commonly replace founder-CEOs 
at major firm-development milestones and the transition from owner-management to professional 
management positively affects investors’ valuations and firm performance (Bennedsen et al. 2007; Chang 
and Shim 2014; Wasserman 2017). Investors’ preference for professional managers is not surprising, 
given that entrepreneurs are often criticized for having limited business expertise and placing personal 
motives ahead of financial returns (e.g., Chen and Thompson 2015; Clarysse and Moray 2004; Gomez-
Mejia et al. 2007).  
In this paper, we investigate what motivates entrepreneurs to retain control or delegate firm 
management to a hired agent at the time of firm founding. We examine the role of the founders’ relevant 
knowledge and skills, opportunity cost of operating a firm personally, and non-pecuniary benefits of 
owner-management. We have gathered fine-grained demographic and employment history data on 
founders and top managers of entrepreneurial ventures started in Denmark between 2001 and 2009. 
Importantly for our study, the dataset allows us to identify whether the founder serves on the firm’s top-
management team. We anticipate that if non-pecuniary motives are the prime driver of the decision to 
become a manager, we will observe a strong impact of non-pecuniary benefits on the entrepreneurs’ 
choice and a weak impact of more strategic considerations, such as relevant prior experience and 
opportunity cost. Our empirical findings, however, do not support this idea. While non-pecuniary motives 
play a role in the founders’ decision to operate their firms personally, opportunity cost and relevant skills 
are equally or even more important. Thus, entrepreneurs put significant emphasis on the characteristics 
that would improve firm performance and their overall wealth. We also observe that when founders do 
not manage their firms personally, they typically work full-time at another firm or play a non-managing 
role in their own venture. 
Taken together, our findings make several contributions to the entrepreneurship literature. First, 
we draw attention to the issues of separation of ownership and control and management in ventures 
founded by entrepreneurs—organizations in which ownership and control have been traditionally 
assumed to be aligned. We also open a broad area for future research on what founders do in their firms 
after founding and how the combination of founders’ characteristics and firm-related activities may affect 
venture outcome. Second, our findings speak to the debate on pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives of 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, we caution empirical studies to be careful when counting top managers of a 
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start-up as founders (e.g., Sorensen 2007) since some of them may be hired employees and their 
characteristics may bias our understanding of which individuals become entrepreneurs. Additionally, our 
findings shed light on the behavior of hybrid entrepreneurs—individuals who do not quit their job when 
they found a start-up (Folta et al. 2010). Finally, our work has implications to the literature on the 
retention of human capital in established organizations. Our results suggest that high opportunity costs 
distract founders from quitting their jobs to manage their firms personally. If we assume that salary is 
positively correlated with employee value, more valuable employees seem less likely to leave their 
employers even after founding own ventures.   
 
Theoretical Background 
Founders and managers 
Prior studies define a firm founder as a person who discovered an opportunity (Hmieleleski et al. 2015), 
established the firm (Eesley et al. 2014; Klotz et al. 2013; Nelson 2003), and owns a significant share1 of 
it (Hvide and Moen 2010; Klotz et al. 2013; Lindquist, Sol, and van Praag, 2015; Ruef et al. 2003). 
Ownership is a core criterion that has been used in the prior work to distinguish founders from early 
employees (Hvide and Moen 2010; Lindquist et al. 2015; Roach and Sauerman 2015). However, unlike 
angel investors, who may have limited engagement in the firm beyond financing it, entrepreneurs are 
expected to both have “significant financial interest” and “participate actively in the development of the 
enterprise” (Cooney 2005: 229). Thus, the majority of studies identify a founder as the creator and the 
owner of the start-up (Lindquist et al. 2015; Roach and Sauremann 2015). Yet the extent of the founders’ 
engagement with the firm may also vary. While earlier studies have typically assumed that in early years 
founders operate their start-ups personally, recent work demonstrates that this should not always be the 
case and it is quite common for founders to delegate firm operation to hired CEOs soon after founding. 
For example, Beckman and Burton (2008) study the evolution of top-management teams in Silicon Valley 
high-technology firms from founding to IPO and note that founders do not always hold top-management 
positions in young start-ups. Kaplan et al. (2009) examine a sample of 50 young US firms in the 
biotechnology, software, telecommunication, healthcare, and retail industries and find that 34 percent had 
a hired CEO at the time of the business plan. Kulchina (2016) and Kulchina and Oxley (2017) track the 
entire population of small businesses in Russia and observe that close to 40 percent of domestic and 
foreign firms have non-founder managers at the time of first sales. In our sample of Danish small 
businesses, we observe that one year after founding, 1,695 start-ups or 10 percent of all newly established 
                                                          
1 A conservative threshold used in the literature is a 20 percent ownership share (e.g., Villalonga and Amit 2006), 
but prior studies indicate that founders and co-founders often own more than that. 50 percent and 100 percent 
founder ownership is quite common (e.g., Hvide and Moen 2010; Kulchina 2016). 
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ventures are run by hired CEOs instead of entrepreneurs themselves. Non-managing founders are still 
significantly engaged with building the firm and developing its strategy, but they do this together with 
their hired managers and are less involved in implementing this strategy and running the firm on a daily 
basis. Coordination of firm operations and hiring of non-management employees are typically delegated 
to a hired manager (Kulchina 2016). Prior work suggests that top managers in small businesses have a lot 
of discretion and power (Miller et al. 2013). Yet non-managing founders bear significantly higher risks 
and rewards associated with the firm than their hired managers (Roach and Sauerman 2015).  
Finding the right manager is one of the most important decisions that founders and directors of an 
organization make. CEOs make significant contributions to a firm’s performance, almost as much as the 
contribution of everything else inside the firm (Mackey 2008). Top-managers are particularly important in 
young start-ups since they have a lot of discretion and a long-lasting imprinting effect on the venture 
(Miller et al. 2013). The literature suggests, however, that founders may not always be the best managers 
for their firms since they may lack business expertise and make strategic decisions based on their personal 
motives rather that the best interest of the firm (e.g., Chen and Thompson 2015; Clarysse and Moray 
2004; Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007). Nevertheless, founders may hold on to the top-management positions in 
their firms even if they are not the optimal managers because they derive non-pecuniary benefits from 
owner-management and are unwilling to share control of their ventures with a hired agent (Kulchina 
2016; Wasserman 2017). 
Entrepreneurs, thereby, face a significant trade-off when hiring an agent-manager. On the one 
hand, founders benefit from managers’ knowledge and social capital. They also free up personal time, 
which can be spent on other activities outside or inside the firm. For example, non-managing founders can 
have outside jobs, be employed at a non-management position in their start-ups and focus on engineering, 
marketing or financial activities, or, in rare cases, not work at all.2 On the other hand, founders give up 
some authority and control over their firms. They are constrained in their ability to make and implement 
strategic decisions and derive non-financial benefits from their businesses. For example, in many 
institutional settings, including Denmark, founders are allowed to sign legal documents on behalf of the 
firm only when they hold a top-management position or serve on the board of directors. Founders’ 
activities within their organizations are also limited, as they have to coordinate with or even report to a 
hired manager. For example, one of the reasons why Steve Jobs initially left Apple was that he no longer 
had power to influence company strategy. A hired CEO, John Sculley, was in charge of the firm. 
                                                          
2 Theoretically, some non-managing entrepreneurs may not work at all, but empirically we observe very few of such 
individuals, less than 2 percent of our sample. These are typically people who are retired or are temporarily out of 
the labor force, such as on parental or medical leave. 
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Learning his mistake, when Jobs founded a new company, NeXT, he became a founder-CEO instead of 
delegating managerial authority to someone else (Isaacson 2011). 
Whether the founders are optimal managers for their firms strongly depends on how they solve 
the above dilemma. If entrepreneurs choose to retain managerial control of their firms in pursuit of non-
pecuniary benefits, their choice is unlikely to be well aligned with firm performance. Prior studies suggest 
that this, indeed, may be the case in young, privately owned start-ups and family firms (Clarysse and 
Moray 2004; Kulchina 2016; Wasserman 2017). Moreover, highly skilled founders may refrain from 
managing their firms personally if they receive higher financial returns to their skills in alternative 
employment. They may become hybrid entrepreneurs (e.g., Folta et al. 2010), working full-time outside 
their start-ups and hiring agents to operate their own ventures. Alternatively, entrepreneurs’ choice to 
operate the firm personally or hire a manager may be driven by the entrepreneurs’ relevant knowledge 
and skills, such that more able founders will be more likely to run their firms personally. In summary, 
entrepreneurs’ choices may be based on different motives, which would have different implications for 
firm performance. Whereas the skills motive is more strongly aligned with firm success, founders driven 
by the opportunity cost and non-pecuniary aspects may give up some firm profit in order to increase their 
personal income and achieve non-financial goals. That is why it is important to understand what 
motivates founders to retain control of their firms. The knowledge of entrepreneurs’ motives for 
managing their firms personally will help shed additional light on the performance of the new ventures. 
Given the importance of top managers in young firms, poorly motivated manager choice may at least 
partially determine why the majority of new ventures fail in the first five years after founding (Campbell 
2013; Small Business Administration 2014; Taylor 1999). 
Despite the importance of the manager choice and the prevalence of non-managing founders, we 
still know little about entrepreneurs’ motives for retaining operational control of their firms versus hiring 
a manager. The traditional view in the literature is that in the early years founders operate their firms 
themselves and may switch to hired managers later in the firm history, often under outside influence. 
Several recent studies have examined situations when founders resigned under the pressure from outside 
investors or after realizing that their skills and experience did not match the needs of their firms 
(Beckman and Burton 2008; Chen and Hambrick 2012; Chen and Thompson 2015; Clarysse and Moray 
2004; Nelson 2003; Wasserman 2003; Wasserman 2017). Only a few studies have examined manager 
assignment in nascent firms, where the choice of manager is more likely to reflect the motives of founders 
rather than the influence of external investors. Those studies have focused on the entrepreneurial 
environment and have found that entrepreneurs are more likely to manage their firms in regions where 
they personally like to live (Kulchina 2016) and when industry conditions allow them to effectively 
govern relationships with their managers (e.g., Kulchina and Oxley 2017). Overall, prior studies provide 
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little indication regarding the founders’ motives in their decision to manage a firm personally, and their 
evidence is indirect at best.  
We address this gap by taking a comprehensive approach to the determinants of the founders’ 
choice of manager that are internal to the founder and the firm. We focus on the founders’ relevant 
knowledge and skills, their opportunity cost of managing a firm personally, and the non-pecuniary 
benefits of owner-management. Below, we further elaborate on each of these potential motives.  
 
Relevant knowledge and skills 
The literature suggests that entrepreneurs with relevant experience and better education have more 
successful start-ups (Cooper et al. 1994; Hsu, 2007; Hvide and Moen 2010; Shane and Stuart 2002; van 
der Sluis and van Praag 2008). While these prior studies have typically focused on founder-managers and 
self-employed individuals, it is reasonable to believe that a founder’s relevant knowledge and experience 
should benefit the ventures during both the founding process and firm management. Chang and Shim 
(2015) and Bennedsen et al. (2007), for example, demonstrate that education matters for professional 
managers of family firms. Indeed, more educated individuals have better knowledge about various aspects 
of life and science (van der Sluis and van Praag 2008). Longer education helps develop cognitive abilities 
and teaches commitment to problem-solving (Cooper et al. 1994). Through relevant prior experience 
founders build skills and tacit knowledge that cannot be learned otherwise (Campbell 2013; Dencker and 
Gruber 2015). Thus, experience in the target industry provides relevant knowledge about technology, 
operating processes, successful business strategies, consumers, suppliers, rivals, and government 
regulations (Dencker and Gruber 2015; Lazear 2005). Prior managerial and founding experiences help an 
individual learn how to operate a business, staff a firm, and build relationships with investors and other 
important stakeholders (Campbell 2013; Dencker and Gruber 2015; Shane and Stuart 2002). Experience 
in the region teaches an entrepreneur the specifics of the region, its consumption potential, and its supply 
pool (Santarelli and Vivarelli 2007). Moreover, prior experiences allow individuals to build relevant 
social capital that will help mobilize necessary resources while managing a young business (Dahl and 
Sorenson 2012; Roberts and Sterling 2012; Shane and Stuart 2002). Thereby, a founder with more 
relevant experience and longer education will likely make a better manager. Conversely, studies suggest 
that when entrepreneurs lack management skills and industry knowledge, they may benefit from hiring a 
manager with relevant business background (e.g., Muller and Murmann 2016). If entrepreneurs aim to 
maximize profit in their firms, they will be more likely to manage them personally if they have better 
education and relevant experiences. Otherwise, they will delegate managerial responsibilities to a hired 
agent who has necessary knowledge and skills. 
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Opportunity cost 
An entrepreneur who operates the firm personally typically needs to spend more time addressing the 
firm’s business matters than a non-managing founder, who hires a manager and is only involved in the 
high-level business decisions. Thus, to manage a firm, a founder will need to quit his or her previous job 
or reduce hours and effort that he or she puts into the outside employment (Hamilton 2000), resulting in 
lost or reduced income outside of the start-up. For some founders, the lost outside income may be 
compensated by the value increase in their firm, but for others it may not. This may be particularly true 
during early start-up years. The higher the entrepreneur’s pre-founding salary, the more likely it is that the 
founder will not be able to fully compensate for it if he or she quits the outside job in order to devote 
himself or herself to managing the start-up (e.g., Campbell et al. 2012). Personal losses may also come in 
the form of reduced job stability or missed future opportunities of career advancement. For example, 
higher-paying and prestigious positions may be scarce, so future opportunities to find a similar-paying job 
may be limited, particularly after a break from regular employment (Folta et al. 2010). Also, losing a 
position at a large established firm may be more costly than quitting a job in a small business (Sorensen 
2007). Finally, the loss may also come in the form of reduced leisure time, and some individuals may 
have very high relative value of leisure. Given such constraints, founders may be more likely to manage 
their firms personally when they have lower opportunity cost of management. 
 
Non-pecuniary motives 
Self-employment and owner-management may also be associated with a variety of positive nonfinancial 
returns. Such returns may include a satisfaction from the ability to do an interesting job and be one’s own 
boss, a convenience of the schedule flexibility and ability to decide one’s own working hours, a pleasure 
from running a family business, a sense of fulfillment from being “the king” and having control over firm 
operations and employees, and a satisfaction from the ability to choose a preferred employment location 
(Dahl and Sorenson 2012; Ehrhardt and Nowak 2003; Hamilton 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 
2002; Wasserman 2017).  
Prior studies have consistently reported that these and other nonfinancial returns play an 
important role in an individual’s decision to become self-employed. Hamilton (2000) and Moskowitz and 
Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), for example, argue that nonfinancial benefits from self-employment are a 
major motivating factor for starting a business. Moreover, these and other studies have documented that 
when choosing an occupation, individuals may be willing to forgo some financial earnings in favor of 
nonfinancial returns. Stern (2004) argues that individuals with a preference for science accept 
employment with lower pay in return for the ability to participate in science. Hamilton (2000) compares 
earnings of self-employed individuals and paid employees and finds that an average individual earns less 
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in self-employment than in paid employment, presumably because an entrepreneur is willing to sacrifice 
substantial monetary earnings in exchange for nonfinancial returns. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2002) demonstrate that, when adjusted for higher risks, entrepreneurship provides lower monetary 
earnings than regular employment, presumably because entrepreneurs are compensated with nonfinancial 
benefits. Surveys conducted among Italian entrepreneurs provide evidence that personal motivations rank 
above profit expectations in the decision to start a business (Santarelli and Vivarelli 2007). Benz and Frey 
(2008) and Blanchflower and Oswald (1998) also demonstrate that self-employed individuals rank 
nonfinancial benefits above financial returns among preferred characteristics of an occupation. 
The best way to consume the non-pecuniary benefits of entrepreneurship to the full extent is by 
founding and managing the firm. When an entrepreneur does not manage the venture personally, he or 
she often works full-time at another company (Chen and Thompson 2015) and does not get full benefits 
of entrepreneurship, such as schedule flexibility, managing other people, autonomy, and doing interesting 
work. Entrepreneurs who work in their firms in non-management positions are also constrained in 
receiving such personal benefits because they need to report to or at least coordinate with a hired 
manager. Thus their autonomy and hours flexibility may be constrained by the hired CEO. In order to 
retain non-pecuniary benefits of management, founders may even be willing to accept lower firm 
performance.  
Not all entrepreneurs, however, are equally sensitive to non-pecuniary returns to owner-
management. Parents of small kids, for example, may value flexibility in work hours more strongly than 
single individuals (Hamilton et al. 2014). Also, entrepreneurs with greater financial stability, such as high 
family wealth or significant spousal income, may place higher value on non-financial benefits of owner-
management. Individuals assigning higher value to the non-financial aspects of owner-management will 
be more likely to manage their firms personally, all else equal. 
 
Data 
Our dataset includes all private start-ups that were founded in Denmark between 2001 and 2009. We use 
four databases to construct our sample: the Board Database, the Firm Database, the Personal Database, 
and the Integrated Database for Labor Market Research (referred to by its Danish acronym, IDA). The 
databases draw from official national registers in Denmark and are maintained by Statistics Denmark. The 
statistics office collects annual information on all individuals residing in Denmark and all business 
entities registered in the country. It also provides individual and firm identifiers that allow linking 
individuals to firms that they have founded or where they are employed. IDA and other data collected by 
Statistics Denmark have been intensively used in academic research (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson 2012; 
Nanda and Sorensen 2010). 
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The Personal Database provides annual information on founders’ demographic characteristics and 
backgrounds, such as gender, age, nationality, marital status, education, income, and kids. The Firm 
Database provides annual firm information, including accounting variables. The Firm Database excludes 
pseudo firms, i.e., businesses that were registered but never operated. The Board Database identifies the 
founders of each new firm together with other key individuals including members of the board of 
directors and top managers. The IDA provides annual employer-employee information and thus allows us 
to merge firm and founder data and track employer-employee relations over time. Together, these data 
provide a unique setting for investigating the characteristics of founders who manage their firms 
personally and those who do not. First, whereas prior studies have often been unable to observe founder’s 
position in the start-up, our dataset allows us to identify whether the founder serves on the firm’s top-
management team or the board of directors, is employed in the firm at a non-management position, or is 
employed somewhere outside the start-up. We can also track founders’ employment history over time, 
which gives us information about their relevant experience, prior occupation, and salary. Moreover, in 
addition to the entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics, such as gender, nationality, age, and others, we can 
track down their family composition, which helps us identify whether any family members manage the 
start-up in place of the founder. Finally, we can effectively control for the characteristics of the new 
ventures, such as industry, location, founding year, and size.  
In line with prior work (e.g., Kulchina 2016), we define an entrepreneurial firm as a small 
business owned by one or several individuals and employing up to 500 employees.3 Also similarly to the 
prior studies (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson 2012), we limit our population of firms to the new ventures with at 
least one employee4 and for which we have information on their founders and top managers. This allows 
us to exclude self-employed individuals without real firms, who are at a very low risk of hiring a 
manager. To avoid inactive ventures, we focus on the companies that meet the minimum functional 
requirements and appear in the Firm Database in the year of the firm’s registration or the year after. We 
further reduce our population of start-ups to the firms founded by a single founder (76% of the sample). 
This allows us to focus on the binary choice between managing a firm personally and hiring a manager, 
rather than complicating it with the option of delegating firm management to a co-founder and having to 
account for the co-founders’ characteristics and fit with the firm. Our final sample consists of 17,144 
entrepreneurs and their firms. We observe these entrepreneurs in a cross-sectional dataset, where 
founders’ characteristics are measured in the year of firm founding or, where appropriate, in the year 
                                                          
3 Most of the firms in our sample (99%) have fewer than 50 employees, and when we limit our analysis to such 
firms, our results are identical to the findings from the complete sample. 
4 At least one employee in addition to the founder if the founder is also a top manager. 
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before, and the characteristics of their start-ups are captured in the year of founding or the year after, 
depending on when the firm started operating.5 
 
Dependent Variable In line with the prior work (e.g., Kulchina 2016), our main dependent variable, 
founder-manager, equals 1 when the founder serves on the top-management team of the new venture and 
0 otherwise. In our sample, 10 percent of founders delegate firm operation to hired managers and 90 
percent run their firms themselves. 
 
Independent Variables 
We broadly group variables into four categories: founder’s characteristics that are likely to be positively 
associated with the extent of relevant knowledge and skills; founder’s characteristics that are likely to 
reflect opportunity cost of management; and founder’s characteristics that are likely to reflect greater 
preference for non-pecuniary benefits at the time of firm founding. We examine whether these 
characteristics have a significant association with the founder’s decision to manage a firm personally as 
opposed to delegating managerial authority to a hired agent. Below we describe which variables are 
included in each category.  
Relevant knowledge and skills: In line with prior studies (e.g., Dahl and Sorenson 2012; McKenzie and 
Woodruff 2016; Folta et al. 2010), we use six variables to capture the extent of the founder’s relevant 
knowledge and skills: education, ln(founding experience), ln(management experience), ln(broad industry 
experience), ln(related industry experience), and ln(region tenure). We expect that the work experience 
variables, region tenure, and education will be positively associated with the founder’s decision to 
manage the firm personally. 
 
Opportunity cost: Since a founder often needs to quit his or her outside job or reduce work hours in order 
to manage a new firm, we use variables reflecting the value of the founder’s recent occupation before 
founding to capture some opportunity cost of owner-management. Specifically, we focus on the most 
recent salary, prior unemployment status, and parent-firm survival.6 We expect that prior salary size will 
                                                          
5 We measure a founder’s relevant experience (founding, top-management, and industry) in the 10 years preceding 
the start-up founding. 
6 Salary may also potentially capture some founder’s skills but the possibility of this is reduced by controlling for the 
experience variables. Also prior studies demonstrate a negative effect of salary on the probability of transitioning 
into entrepreneurship. This suggests that the negative effect of opportunity costs captured by salary dominates any 
confounded positive effect of skills, particularly when skills are more directly accounted for by the experience 
variables. 
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be negatively associated with the probability of founder-management, whereas parent-firm death and 
unemployment status will be positively associated with it. 
 
Non-pecuniary motives: We use two approaches to capturing non-pecuniary motives of entrepreneurs. 
Prior literature suggests that key non-pecuniary benefits of self-employment are autonomy and schedule 
flexibility (Hamilton 2000; Parasuraman and Simmers 2001). Entrepreneurship research has found that 
individuals with small kids assign particularly high value to schedule flexibility and autonomy (Boden, 
1996). To proxy for the extent to which a founder may value work-schedule flexibility, we use the 
variable small kids. In line with the prior literature (e.g., Parasuraman and Simmers 2001), we define it 
as the number of kids 5 years or younger. Furthermore, Dahl and Sorenson (2012) report that 
individuals prefer to work and found firms in the municipalities where they live as they receive personal 
satisfaction from staying close to family and friends. In line with this logic, we expect that an individual 
whose employer is located farther from their place of living, i.e., in a different municipality, will benefit 
from switching from such a remote job to managing a start-up located close to home. To capture this, 
we use a dummy variable distant parent firm.  
In addition to the proxy variables above, we use survey data that allows us to more closely capture the 
non-pecuniary motives of entrepreneurs. Individuals often become entrepreneurs in order to get 
autonomy and flexible work hours (Georgellis and Yusuf 2016; Hamilton 2000). In 2008, Statistics 
Denmark conducted a survey where it asked entrepreneurs who founded businesses in 2004 how 
important certain factors were for their decision to start a business. The survey included 201 
entrepreneurs from our sample. They were asked about the importance of (1) “the desire to be my own 
employer” and (2) “the desire to decide the working hours” for their decision to start their own business. 
Respondents could answer “very important,” “important,” “not important,” and “don’t know.” We 
construct two dummy variables, autonomy and flexibility, which equal 1 when an entrepreneur reported 
that these characteristics were very important or important for his or her decision to start a business and 
0 otherwise. We anticipate a positive association between the desire for autonomy and flexibility and the 
probability of founder-management. 
Control variables: In line with prior literature, we also control for a battery observed founder and firm 
characteristics that may be correlated with the choice of manager and any of our variables of interest.   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for key variables.  
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----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
We observe that founders who manage their firms personally are quite different from the founders 
who do not. On the basic demographic characteristics, founder-managers are 21 percentage points more 
likely to be male and 3 percentage points less likely to be married. In addition, managing entrepreneurs 
have more small kids, which may lead to their higher preference for flexibility and autonomy. Founder-
managers are also less likely to own other start-ups but are 7 percentage points more likely to have 
parents who have also been entrepreneurs. Founder-managers have higher non-wage income and their 
spouses earn more, but their family wealth is still the same as for non-managing founders. Founder-
managers are less likely to have worked for a distant parent firm. Their previous employer is smaller, 
younger, and more profitable, but surprisingly also more likely to exit in the near future. Moreover, 
managing founders have lower salary prior to founding the start-up. Together with the higher probability 
of the parent-firm death, these observations point to the lower opportunity cost of management for 
founders who choose to manage their firms personally. Founder-managers are also more experienced than 
non-managing entrepreneurs, which suggests that they likely have better knowledge and skills.   
 
Empirical Model 
Our empirical analysis consists of two main parts. In the first part, we examine how entrepreneurs who 
manage their firms personally are different from those who delegate firm operations to a hired manager. 
We determine whether observed patterns are consistent with any of the motivations for retaining 
management position that have been proposed in the theoretical section. In the second part, we explore 
what founders do when they choose not to operate their firms personally, i.e., whether they serve on the 
start-up’s board of directors and whether they work outside of their firms or are employed at a non-
management position in their own ventures. 
To examine how our key independent variables are associated with the founders’ decision to 
manage their firms personally, we estimate a set of Probit models with the dependent variable, 
𝑓𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 − 𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑖. This variable is a dummy that equals 1 when the founder serves on the top-
management team of the firm and 0 otherwise. 
 
Founder-Managers Versus Non-managing Founders 
Tables 2 and 3 estimate the probability that a founder will manage a firm personally rather than delegate 
firm management to hired agents. Table 2 shows the baseline model with main control variables. Table 3 
focuses on the key independent variables associated with the three motives for founder-management, i.e., 
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relevant skills, opportunity cost, and non-pecuniary benefits. Model 2 of Table 2 and Model 5 of Table 3 
report marginal effects of changing independent variables by one unit from the mean.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
The results for the key control variables suggest that compared to non-managing entrepreneurs, 
founders who manage their firms personally are younger, more likely to be male, less likely to be married, 
and less likely to own other start-ups, and their parents are more likely to be former or current 
entrepreneurs.  
Small but positive coefficients for firm size and founder’s non-wage income and a positive 
association between founder-management and the number of top managers contradict the idea that 
entrepreneurs operate their firms personally because they cannot afford to hire a manager—if that were 
true, we would have observed wealthier entrepreneurs and founders of larger firms being less likely to run 
their firms themselves, which is contrary to our findings.  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Models 1 and 4 of Table 3 point to a consistent positive association between the likelihood of 
founder-management and the entrepreneur’s top-management experience, industry experience, and 
municipality tenure. Municipality tenure and related (four-digit) industry experience seem to be the most 
impactful on the founder’s decision to run a firm personally, whereas broad industry experience and top-
management experience are less important. Thus, moving from no experience to 10 years of experience 
(or moving one standard deviation above the mean) is associated with 8.3 (2.2) percentage point increase 
in the probability of founder-management for municipality tenure; 7.2 (2.5) for related industry 
experience; 3.2 (1.1) for the broad industry experience; 2.5 (0.6) for the top-management experience; and 
4.1 (0.9) for the general work experience.7  
The impact of entrepreneurial experience is less consistent. The positive association observed in 
Model 1 disappears once we add other characteristics of entrepreneurs. These findings are, however, 
consistent with prior studies that have found mixed results for the impact of prior founding experience on 
firm success (Roberts et al. 2013; Shane and Stuart 2002; Campbell 2013).  
                                                          
7 The magnitudes of the effects are reported from Model 5 (other variable are taken at their means) and additional 
calculations by the authors based on Model 4 (available on request). 
14 
 
Also, contrary to our expectations, we find that founders with more years of education seem less 
likely to run their firms personally. These findings may be due to education capturing both relevant skills 
and some opportunity cost of management (perhaps long-term career prospects, which are not accounted 
for by the prior salary). More educated individuals have better knowledge, skills, problem-solving ability, 
and motivation. Therefore, they will be better at coping with problems. However, they may also have 
better outside opportunities and long-term career expectations, which would lead to higher opportunity 
cost of owner-management (Cooper et al. 1994). If the opportunity-cost effect dominates the skills effect, 
the net impact of education on the founder’s management choice will be negative. 
Overall, however, our findings in Models 2 and 5 are largely in line with the expectation that 
entrepreneurs’ decision to operate their firms personally is motivated, at least partially, by their relevant 
knowledge and skills obtained through prior work and region experience.  
Models 2 and 4 examine whether founders who presumably have higher opportunity cost of 
management are less likely to run their firms themselves and more likely to use hired managers. Our 
results for the founder’s salary prior to founding a firm are consistent with this idea. Moving one standard 
deviation above the mean in salary is associated with a 1.3 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
founder-management. Working in an organization that stopped existing soon after the start-up founding is 
associated with a 3.5 percentage point increase in the probability of having a managing founder. 
Interestingly, unemployment does not seem to have a significant impact on the decision to manage a firm 
personally. This suggests that individuals who are more likely to be need-based entrepreneurs are not 
rushing into managing their firms. The lack of significant finding may be due to previously unemployed 
entrepreneurs having lower abilities (Taylor 1999) but realizing such a limitation and hiring agent-
managers whenever necessary. The positive opportunity-cost effect and the negative ability effect thus 
compensate each other. 
Finally, Models 3 and 4 address the issue of non-pecuniary motives. We find that entrepreneurs 
with small kids are more likely to manage their firms personally. Interestingly, the coefficient for the 
distant parent firm is initially negative, but turns positive (the expected direction) in the complete model, 
which controls for a larger number of entrepreneur’s characteristics. The effect size of working at a 
distant parent firm is 1.1 percentage points.  
To further investigate the impact of non-pecuniary benefits, we turn to the survey responses and 
examine whether individuals who are strongly motivated to become entrepreneurs by the desire to 
become own employer and the desire to decide the working hours are more likely to manage their firms 
personally, since firm management presumably gives them better opportunity to gain such nonpecuniary 
benefits of entrepreneurship. Since only a small part of our sample participated in the survey, we limit the 
number of control variables that we use in these models to the key demographic characteristics. The 
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coefficient for autonomy in Table 4 is positive but not statistically significant at any conventional level. 
The coefficient for flexibility is positive and significant. Founders who are strongly attracted to self-
employment by the desire to decide the working hours are 7.4 percentage points more likely to manage 
their firms personally. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Taken together, our findings for the number of small kids, distant prior employment, and the 
significance of schedule flexibility are consistent with the idea that founders who value non-pecuniary 
benefits of entrepreneurship higher than others are more likely to manage their firms personally. 
In summary, our findings suggest that all three motives (relevant knowledge and skills, 
opportunity cost, and non-pecuniary benefits) play a role in the entrepreneurs’ decision to manage a firm 
personally rather than delegate firm operation to hired managers. The magnitudes of the effects are 
economically significant. And while the impact of non-pecuniary factors seems relatively strong, the 
effects of relevant knowledge and skills and opportunity cost are comparable in size to the impact of non-
pecuniary motives.8  
 
What Do Non-managing Founders Do? 
The final question that we want to explore in our study is what founders do when they do not manage 
their firms personally. We focus on two types of activities. First, we examine whether non-managing 
founders are likely to serve on the board of directors. Second, we examine whether non-managing 
founders work outside of their firms or are employed at non-management positions inside their own 
ventures. 
Joining the board of directors 
While being on the board does not perfectly substitute for being a CEO of the firm, it can give a non-
managing founder more control over the firm and more non-pecuniary benefits of control than having no 
formal leadership position in the start-up.  
 
                                                          
8 In additional analyses, we further examined whether certain motives are more or less important for certain groups 
of entrepreneurs. We find that the motives for managing a firm personally are largely the same for entrepreneurs in 
high-technology and low-technology sectors and for male and female founders and for entrepreneurs who hire 
family and non-family managers. Estimations are available upon request.   
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In general, 19 percent of firms in our sample had boards of directors at the time of founding. The 
average number of board members is 3, but the number can range from 1 to 15. In line with our 
expectations, firms with non-managing founders are more likely to have boards of directors (39% versus 
17% for firms with founder-managers).  
We expect that non-managing founders serving on the board of directors can significantly impact 
the strategy of the firm; therefore, their skills are important. However, non-managing founders joining the 
board do not need to give up alternative employment and do not have work-schedule flexibility or full 
autonomy. Therefore, opportunity cost and non-pecuniary benefits should play a small role in motivating 
non-managing founders to join a board of directors.  
In Model 1 of Table 6, we examine how non-managing founders who serve on the board of 
directors differ from the ones who do not.9 Having longer relevant work experience (entrepreneurial, top-
management, and industry) has a positive association with serving on the board, whereas region tenure 
reduces the probability of being on the board of directors. The negative association with the region tenure 
is perhaps due to the fact that founders with local experience may find it easier to engage other qualified 
local experts to take their place on the board. 
Non-managing founders who serve on the board also have higher prior salary, more small kids, 
are more likely to be male. The positive coefficient for salary is likely driven by the fact that since 
founders do not need to quit their alternative employment to join the board, prior salary is capturing just 
the positive impact of skills, rather than the net of the opportunity cost and skills. Firms where non-
managing founders serve on the board have more employees at entry (average difference is 3 employees), 
but slightly fewer top managers (the average difference is only 0.02 people).  
 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
----------------------------------- 
 
Consistent with our predictions, these results imply that the decision to join the board is driven 
more heavily by relevant knowledge and skills, whereas opportunity cost and non-pecuniary benefits play 
a smaller or no role at all in this decision. This is different from the decision to manage a firm, which is 
driven by all three motives. We observe such a difference presumably because managing founders have to 
give up or reduce their alternative employment but gain some non-pecuniary benefits, whereas non-
managing founders joining the board do not need to give up their alternatives jobs, but gain less in non-
                                                          
9 Here we include firms with and without boards of directors, assuming that the founder can always build the board 
if he wants to join one. However, our results also hold if we limit our sample to firms that already have boards of 
directors at the time of observation and examine whether the founder serves on that board. 
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pecuniary benefits than they would receive through firm management. Moreover, we observe that 
different types of relevant experience have different importance for the decision to manage and firm and 
for the decision to join the board. The top-management experience and founding experience are 
significantly more important for the decision to join the board than the decision to manage a firm. This is 
perhaps due to the fact that members of the board are more engaged in the high-level business-strategy 
decisions where the prior entrepreneurial and top-management experiences have the highest value.  
In Model 4, we turn our attention to founder-managers and examine whether their choice to join 
the board of directors is motivated by the same factors as for non-managing founders. This is indeed the 
case, and, with a few exceptions, our findings for founder-managers and non-managing founders are very 
similar for founder-managers.  
 
Alternative employment 
Finally, we would like to examine whether non-managing founders still work in their own firms at non-
management positions or hold primary employment outside of their firms. To do so, we examine primary 
occupation of non-managing founders one year after they have founded their firms (t+1). If a founder 
holds a formal position inside or outside his or her firm, such position is typically listed as the founder’s 
primary occupation. We have also examined secondary occupations of founders, but none of the founders 
lists a secondary occupation other than “being an entrepreneur” or “being outside of the labor force.”10  
Among non-managing founders, 38 percent are employed in their firms in non-management 
positions, 60 percent work outside their firms, and the remaining 2 percent are out of the labor force. For 
comparison, only 15 percent of founder-managers have another job outside of their start-ups. Based on 
the prior literature, entrepreneurs who also hold jobs outside of their firms can be considered hybrid 
entrepreneurs (e.g., Folta et al. 2010). While we do not observe exact job titles of entrepreneurs who work 
outside of their firms, we know whether they work as blue-collar, white-collar, or top-management 
employees, or if they are listed as founders of other ventures. Table 7 reports occupational distributions of 
managing and non-managing founders who work outside of their start-ups or are outside the labor force 
(typically, on leave from formal employment or retired). We can see that non-managing founders are 
more likely to have white-collar and top-management jobs, whereas founder-managers who also work 
outside their firms are more likely to hold blue-collar positions in outside organizations. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
----------------------------------- 
                                   
                                                          
10 This is equivalent to having no secondary occupation. 
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In Models 2 and 3 of Table 6, we examine which non-managing founders are more likely to work 
at non-management positions inside their own start-ups and which non-managing founders are more 
likely to work in other organizations. Our dependent variable equals 1 when the non-managing founder 
works in his or her start-up and 0 when he or she works in some other organization.11 We exclude from 
our estimation sample 37 non-managing founders who do not work anywhere (outside of the labor force); 
they constitute 2 percent of all non-managing founders.  
Overall, our results imply that non-managing founders prefer to work outside when they have 
more stable and more lucrative prior employment and higher level of general skills, but are more likely to 
work in their start-ups when they have better industry-specific skills and their firms are larger and operate 
in the high-technology sector. In terms of non-pecuniary benefits, we did not find any significant 
association between the number of small kids or distant parent firm and the probability of working in the 
start-up. However, we have observed that 43 percent of non-managing founders who value schedule 
flexibility work in their start-ups as opposed to 10 percent of non-managing founders who assign low 
value to such flexibility. 
In sum, these findings suggest that the factors motivating non-managing founders’ decision to 
work in their firms versus outside are quite similar to the motives of the original decision of whether to 
manage the start-up personally or not. One key difference is that whereas unemployed individuals do not 
rush to manage their firms personally, they still have a stronger tendency to work in their firms at non-
management positions than founders with more stable prior employment. The same is true for the 
founders of high-technology ventures. They are no more likely to manage their firms personally than the 
founders of low-technology start-ups, but they are significantly more likely to work in their firms at non-
management positions. Prior salary also seems to play a greater role in the decision to work in own firm. 
This suggests that the opportunity costs are even more important for the decision to join own start-up than 
the decision to operate it. Conversely, region tenure seems to play a less significant role, perhaps since 
local social capital of founders matters less when they just work in their start-ups versus manage them. 
In Models 5 and 6, we focus on founder-managers and examine what motivates them to work just 
in their own start-ups versus taking a second job somewhere outside. The findings for the opportunity cost 
and non-pecuniary motives are similar to the ones for non-managing founders. Thus, for example, 
founder-managers with higher opportunity cost of management are more likely to take another job outside 
of their firms. The impact of relevant experience is even more pronounced than for non-managing 
founders: Founder-managers with greater industry and region experience are more likely to work only in 
                                                          
11 In theory, non-managing founders could do both, but empirically we observe no cases of non-managing founders 
who simultaneously hold a formal position in their own start-up and work in an outside organization. 
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their firms, whereas founder-managers with greater top-management experience are more likely to seek 
outside jobs.  
 
Conclusion 
The business literature has long been concerned with the questions of why people found new firms and 
what makes their ventures successful. The key person in the firm is the founder, and the success of the 
firm depends not just on the quality of the founder’s business idea, but also on the founder’s engagement 
with the firm after its founding. One of the most important roles that a founder can play in a start-up is the 
role of the top manager. However, founders are being criticized for taking such a role to gain personal 
non-pecuniary benefits, even when they are not the best managers for their ventures (e.g., Wasserman, 
2017).  
In our paper, we have examined more closely which factors may motivate the founder to operate 
the firm personally versus to delegate firm management to a hired agent. Our findings are consistent with 
the idea that while non-pecuniary motives play a role in the decision to manage a firm personally, relevant 
knowledge and skill and opportunity cost are also important drivers of the entrepreneur’s choice. These 
findings imply that founders are, perhaps, more strongly motivated by firm performance and their overall 
financial income than suggested by the prior literature. However, since owner-management choice is not 
solely driven by the founders’ relevant experience, their decision to operate the firm personally is not 
perfectly aligned with the start-up performance. Thus, founders with high opportunity cost of 
management may avoid managing their firms personally even when they would be good managers for 
their firms, whereas entrepreneurs who assign high value to the flexibility of work hours may operate 
their ventures themselves even when they are not best managers for their businesses. 
As a next step, we have investigated what founders do when they do not manage their firms 
personally. First, we have studied their choice to join the new firm’s board of directors. Our results are in 
line with the notion that founders’ relevant experience is an important driver of this decision. However, 
whereas management choice is significantly driven by the related industry experience and region tenure, 
the decision to join the board is more heavily based on the founder’s top-management experience. 
Moreover, since entrepreneurs do not need to quit their alternative employment to join the board, their 
prior salary and the stability of prior employment do not play a role in their decision to join the board.  
Finally, we examine whether non-managing founders work outside of their start-ups or are 
employed in their own firms at non-management positions. We find that all three motives—relevant 
knowledge and skills, opportunity cost, and non-pecuniary benefits—play a role in the non-managing 
founder’s decision to work in his or her own firm rather than take a job in an outside organization.  
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From the theoretical point of view, our results are consistent with the notion that entrepreneurs 
are more likely to manage their firms personally when they have better relevant skills, have low 
opportunity cost of management, and value non-pecuniary benefits of owner-management, such as 
schedule flexibility. In future work, however, it would be useful to examine how much of the firm profit 
they are willing to give up to gain non-financial benefits of owner-management and to retain their 
alternative employment. It would also be helpful to further explore under which conditions founders may 
be more or less heavily driven by different motives of owner-management. Whereas we have examined 
the heterogeneity of founder types and firm technology intensity, the relative importance of management 
motives may also depend on the institutional environment of start-ups. For example, in countries with no 
public health insurance and lower social security benefits, the negative impact of opportunity cost on the 
founder-management choice may be stronger. In countries with high family values, the positive impact of 
non-pecuniary benefits, such as schedule flexibility, may be more significant. However, while we would 
welcome replication of our findings in other institutional environments, we expect that on the theoretical 
level our results would still be important even if the magnitudes of the effect may vary in other settings. 
Taken together, our findings make several contributions to the entrepreneurship literature and 
open multiple areas for future research. First, we draw attention to the issue of separation of ownership 
and control and management of young small businesses founded by entrepreneurs. While the literature 
has primarily assumed that such a separation typically happens later in the firm history, often under the 
pressure of the outside stakeholders (e.g., Beckman and Burton 2008; Chen and Hambrick 2012; 
Wasserman 2017), our paper is one of the first to demonstrate that a significant share of founders delegate 
managerial control of their firms to hired agents from the time of founding. We also show that 
entrepreneurs are systematically different in regard to this decision. Moreover, our study informs growing 
research on hybrid entrepreneurs (e.g., Folta et.al. 2010)—individuals who found start-ups while 
continuing to hold outside employment—since the majority of the non-managing founders can be 
considered hybrid entrepreneurs. 
Second, our findings speak to the debate on pecuniary and non-pecuniary motives of 
entrepreneurs (e.g., Gomez-Mejia et al. 2007; Hamilton 2000; Wasserman 2017) by demonstrating that in 
their decision to operate the firm personally entrepreneurs are also heavily driven by strategic 
considerations that are aligned with firm performance and personal wealth. One of the limitations of the 
current study is that we do not directly observe founders’ motives but infer them from the founders’ 
demographic characteristic and backgrounds. In future work, it may be helpful to do a survey of 
entrepreneurs, which would allow researchers to develop a more nuanced understanding of the founders’ 
motivation to run a firm personally or delegate firm operation to a hired agent. 
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Moreover, while prior empirical studies sometimes counted every person present in the firm or 
managing it in its early years as an entrepreneur (e.g., Sorensen 2007), our study suggests that this may be 
a risky approach. Some of these people may be hired managers and their characteristics may be 
significantly different from the characteristics of real founders. Also, some of the true entrepreneurs may 
be omitted from the analysis. Such an approach may bias our understanding of which individuals are 
more likely to become entrepreneurs.  
Finally, our work has implications to the literature on human capital in established organizations 
(e.g., Campbell et al. 2012). Established firms often hesitate to encourage their employees to be creative 
and entrepreneurial in the fear that employees will leave to start their own ventures. Our findings suggest 
that not all employees who start their firms will leave their prior employers. If we believe that salary is 
positively correlated with skills and value, more skillful and valuable employees are less likely to leave 
their employers even after founding own ventures.   
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
Variable All 
 Founder-
managers 
 Non-managing 
founders 
 
(3) - (5) 
 Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 
Mean S.D. 
 Difference in 
means 
Founder-manager 0.90 0.30         
Education 13.20 2.39  13.19 2.35  13.35 2.72  -0.1581*** 
Ln(founding experience) 1.13 0.98  1.16 0.97  0.80 0.98  0.3610*** 
Ln(management 
experience) 
0.12 0.40 
 
0.12 0.40 
 
0.12 0.42 
 
-0.0074 
Ln(broad industry exp) 0.42 0.74  0.43 0.75  0.28 0.65  0.1577*** 
Ln(related industry exp) 1.01 1.00  1.08 1.00  0.40 0.78  0.6724*** 
Ln(region tenure) 1.72 0.97  1.76 0.94  1.27 1.12  0.4934*** 
Ln(work experience) 2.50 0.69  2.49 0.68  2.53 0.72  -0.0411** 
Ln(salary) 6.83 6.16  6.54 6.17  9.48 5.31  -2.9379*** 
Ln(unemployment 
duration) 
0.14 0.64 
 
0.13 0.63 
 
0.19 0.75 
 
-0.0556*** 
Parent-firm death 0.51 0.50  0.54 0.50  0.25 0.43  0.2920*** 
Ln(parent-firm size) 2.61 2.32  2.50 2.24  3.59 2.81  -1.0897*** 
Parent-firm ROA 23.81 32.44  24.75 33.09  15.28 24.14  9.4665*** 
Ln(parent-firm age) 2.20 0.99  2.18 0.99  2.41 1.01  -0.2327*** 
Small kids 0.37 0.67  0.38 0.67  0.27 0.59  0.1113*** 
Big kids 0.78 0.99  0.77 0.99  0.81 1.02  -0.0361* 
Distant parent firm 0.31 0.46  0.30 0.46  0.39 0.49  -0.0885*** 
Ln(age) 3.69 0.25  3.68 0.24  3.72 0.28  -0.0395*** 
Female 0.16 0.37  0.14 0.35  0.35 0.48  -0.1643*** 
Married 0.63 0.48  0.63 0.48  0.66 0.47  -0.0329*** 
Danish 0.98 0.15  0.98 0.15  0.97 0.16  0.0015 
Multiple start-ups 0.35 0.48  0.34 0.47  0.39 0.49  -0.0547*** 
Ln(non-wage income) 10.13 4.44  10.28 4.38  8.80 4.76  1.4776*** 
Ln(spouse income) 10.08 4.88  10.10 4.86  9.88 5.05  0.2254** 
Ln(family wealth) 14.00 2.01  14.00 1.97  13.95 2.35  0.0537 
Parent entrepreneur 0.37 0.48  0.38 0.49  0.31 0.46  0.0722*** 
Ln(employees) 1.03 1.02  1.06 1.02  0.79 1.01  0.2735*** 
On board 0.16 0.37  0.15 0.36  0.30 0.46  -0.1497*** 
N managers 1.08 0.30  1.08 0.30  1.08 0.31  -0.0026 
N obs. 17,144   15,449   1,695    
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2. Baseline Model with Main Control Variables 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Baseline Marginal effects 
Dependent variable Founder-manager 
Ln(age) -0.272*** -0.036*** 
 (0.073) (0.010) 
Female -0.760*** -0.145*** 
 (0.036) (0.009) 
Married -0.124*** -0.016*** 
 (0.040) (0.005) 
Danish -0.110 -0.014 
 (0.094) (0.011) 
Multiple start-ups -0.199*** -0.028*** 
 (0.031) (0.005) 
Ln(non-wage income) 0.033*** 0.004*** 
 (0.003) (0.000) 
Ln(spouse income) 0.009** 0.001** 
 (0.004) (0.000) 
Ln(family wealth) 0.006 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.001) 
Parent entrepreneur 0.134*** 0.017*** 
 (0.031) (0.004) 
Ln(employees) 0.209*** 0.028*** 
 (0.018) (0.002) 
On board -0.661*** -0.121*** 
 (0.037) (0.009) 
N managers 0.115** 0.015** 
 (0.052) (0.007) 
Constant 1.967***  
 (0.335)  
Region (98 dummies) Yes  Yes  
Industry (80 dummies) Yes  Yes  
Entry year (9 dummies) Yes  Yes  
N 17,144 17,144 
pseudo R2 0.150  
All regressions are Probit models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3. Founder-Managers Versus Non-managing Founders 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable Skills 
Opportunity 
cost 
Non-pecuniary 
benefits 
All 
Marginal 
effects 
Dependent variable Founder-manager 
Education -0.027***   -0.025*** -0.003*** 
 (0.007)   (0.007) (0.001) 
Ln(founding experience) 0.126***   -0.011 -0.001 
 (0.024)   (0.029) (0.003) 
Ln(management experience) 0.132***   0.132*** 0.014*** 
 (0.038)   (0.039) (0.004) 
Ln(broad industry exp) 0.176***   0.158*** 0.016*** 
 (0.023)   (0.024) (0.002) 
Ln(related industry exp) 0.361***   0.313*** 0.032*** 
 (0.020)   (0.020) (0.002) 
Ln(region tenure) 0.257***   0.267*** 0.027*** 
 (0.016)   (0.016) (0.002) 
Ln(work experience) 0.137***   0.127*** 0.013*** 
 (0.026)   (0.027) (0.003) 
Ln(salary)  -0.014***  -0.020*** -0.002*** 
  (0.004)  (0.005) (0.000) 
Ln(unemployment duration)  -0.004  0.011 0.001 
  (0.022)  (0.023) (0.002) 
Parent-firm death  0.466***  0.340*** 0.035*** 
  (0.040)  (0.040) (0.004) 
Ln(parent-firm size)  -0.025***  -0.018** -0.002** 
  (0.007)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Parent-firm ROA  0.000  0.000 0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) (0.000) 
Ln(parent-firm age)  -0.023  -0.024 -0.002 
  (0.016)  (0.016) (0.002) 
Small kids   0.108*** 0.115*** 0.012*** 
   (0.027) (0.028) (0.003) 
Big kids   0.009 0.009 0.001 
   (0.016) (0.017) (0.002) 
Distant parent firm   -0.186*** 0.111*** 0.011*** 
   (0.032) (0.036) (0.003) 
Constant 2.799*** 2.251*** 1.712*** 2.259***  
 (0.370) (0.347) (0.352) (0.392)  
Control variables 
All variables included in Table 2 (including industry, region, and 
founding year dummies) 
N 17,144 17,144 17,144 17,144 17,144 
pseudo R2 0.228 0.184 0.154 0.245 0.245 
All regressions are Probit models. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4. Non-pecuniary Motives: Autonomy and Flexibility 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Autonomy Flexibility 
Dependent variable Founder-manager 
Autonomy 0.131  
 (0.360)  
Flexibility  0.498** 
  (0.249) 
Ln(age) -1.507*** -1.546*** 
 (0.535) (0.578) 
Female 0.232 -0.040 
 (0.330) (0.328) 
Married -0.045 0.121 
 (0.304) (0.299) 
Constant 6.863*** 6.744*** 
 -2.141 -2.113 
N 199 201 
pseudo R2 0.056 0.088 
All regressions are Probit models. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
  
29 
 
Table 6. What Do Non-managing Founders Do? 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
 Non-managing founders 
 
Managing founders 
 Non-managing 
vs. managing  
Variable On board 
Working in own firm 
vs. outside 
 
On board 
Working in own firm only 
vs. also working outside 
 (1) vs. 
(4) 
(3) vs. 
(6) 
Dependent variable On board 
Working in 
own firm 
Working in 
own firm 
 
On board 
Working 
in own 
firm only 
Working in 
own firm 
only 
 
  
Education -0.031* -0.070*** -0.063***  0.006 0.000 0.022***  ** *** 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.016)  (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)    
Ln(founding exp) 0.154** -0.173** -0.147**  0.093*** -0.258*** -0.288***  ns * 
 (0.067) (0.075) (0.071)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)    
Ln(management exp) 0.401*** 0.146 0.156  0.132*** -0.084** -0.084**  *** ** 
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.095)  (0.034) (0.035) (0.034)    
Ln(broad industry exp) 0.101* 0.066 0.101*  -0.031 0.177*** 0.188***  ** ns 
 (0.059) (0.061) (0.058)  (0.020) (0.021) (0.020)    
Ln(related industry exp) 0.224*** 0.430*** 0.394***  0.001 0.271*** 0.279***  *** ** 
 (0.055) (0.060) (0.055)  (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)    
Ln(region tenure) -0.116*** 0.049 0.041  -0.068*** 0.110*** 0.119***  ns * 
 (0.039) (0.042) (0.040)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)    
Ln(work experience) 0.088 -0.280*** -0.259***  0.010 0.052* 0.033    
 (0.074) (0.082) (0.079)  (0.025) (0.027) (0.026)    
Ln(salary) 0.024** -0.057*** -0.048***  -0.012*** -0.044*** -0.045***  *** ns 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)    
Ln(unemployment 
duration) 
0.075 0.099* 0.098*  -0.019 0.063** 0.053**  ns ns 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.053)  (0.028) (0.025) (0.024)    
Parent-firm death -0.085 0.440*** 0.442***  0.005 0.410*** 0.443***  ns * 
 (0.100) (0.100) (0.095)  (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)    
Ln(parent-firm size) -0.057*** -0.075*** -0.079***  0.016* -0.055*** -0.052***    
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.019)  (0.034) (0.008) (0.008)    
Parent-firm ROA -0.004** -0.000 -0.000  -0.002*** 0.001** 0.001**    
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)    
Ln(parent-firm age) 0.105** 0.064 0.072  0.055*** 0.068*** 0.071***    
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.045)  (0.017) (0.016) (0.016)    
Small kids 0.145** 0.007 0.016  -0.047** 0.007 0.020  *** ns 
 (0.070) (0.075) (0.070)  (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)    
Big kids -0.097** -0.059 -0.049  0.010 -0.022 -0.015    
 (0.042) (0.046) (0.043)  (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)    
Distant parent firm -0.153* -0.086 -0.056  -0.043 0.115*** 0.125***  ns ns 
 (0.088) (0.092) (0.087)  (0.037) (0.035) (0.035)    
High-technology   0.451***    0.200***   ns 
   (0.141)    (0.064)    
Constant -0.253 1.756* 1.164  -1.199*** 1.926*** 1.473***    
 (0.924) (0.977) (0.857)  (0.365) (0.372) (0.339)    
Control variables All variables included in Table 2 (including industry, region, and founding year dummies) 
N 1,695 1,552 1,552  15,449 14,666 14,666    
pseudo R2 0.242 0.292 0.260  0.170 0.198 0.175    
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. ns stands for non-significant at any conventional level. 
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Table 7. Occupation Type for Founders Who Work Outside of Their Firms or Are Outside of the Labor 
Force 
Occupation type Non-managing founders Managing founders 
Blue-collar 41% 51% 
White-collar 29% 20% 
Top manager 25% 24% 
Entrepreneur  2% 2% 
Outside of the labor force 3% 3% 
N obs. 1,043 2,266 
 
 
